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Why institutions and Governance matter?  
 
Differences in political ideology might lead to different views about the role of the 
state in the provision of public services across countries, or even in the same 
country over time.2 At the same time, it is clear that effectiveness of institutions 
associated with the generation and use of public resources vary considerably across 
countries. Despite the nominal presence of institutions that resemble best practice, 
many countries have difficulties in effectively generating public resources and 
ensuring that the generated resources are not misappropriated or badly utilized.  
Political choices at each level of government matter, and incentives facing officials 
and politicians determine whether an appropriate environment is created for 
sustainable investment.  
 
Institutions do not operate in a vacuum, and the context in which the organizational 
structure is established, may lead to very different results in Mexico as opposed to a 
similar structure in Brazil, or China. This is because incentives matter, and the 
balance of power and influence of elites, including bureaucracies, may determine 
whether or not an organizational structure generates rents at the behest of vested 
interests, especially in societies that North terms “limited access orders.” Thus, 
attempts by international agencies to propagate “best practices” quite often fail.   
 
Sustainable and inclusive growth in multi-level countries depends on creating the 
right incentive structures for public and private investments, and supporting public 
service delivery at each level of government. Many of the organizations are the same 
across the world, and constitute budgetary and revenue agency functions 
encompassing the sources and uses of funds. However, the context matters, and the 
wider set of incentives facing officials and politicians often result in different 
institutional arrangements (North, 1990).  
 
This paper focuses on the incentives facing politicians and officials to use public 
resources efficiently—both their own and from donor agencies, as well as those 
provided by higher levels of government in the case of sub-national entities. As the 
recent crisis in Europe has shown, weaknesses in institutions and information flows 
affect the incentives facing subnational governments and associated central and 
subnational entities. This has resulted in unsustainable and unproductive 
investments, leading to a collapse in the overall macroeconomic framework in 
                                                        
2 This is sharply seen in the case of the United States and the differences in world 
view between Republicans and Democrats. 
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countries from Ireland to Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece—and indeed similar 
influences were at play in the Latin American and Asian crises in the 1990s. The 
focus had become to attract funds from higher levels, or capital markets, to the 
detriment of accountability to the relevant electorates, or effectiveness of provision.  
 
Public financial management (PFM), somewhat narrowly defined, in terms of 
processes and organizations, including budget preparation and execution, audit, 
accounting and reporting, was recognized by international agencies as being 
relevant for decentralized operations (Ter-Minassian 1997). However, the more 
recent literature on the political economy of multi-level governance (see Ahmad and 
Brosio, 2006) places the design of institutions and associated flow of information at 
the heart the structure of incentives that underpin the public policy debate.  
 
In this paper, we recast the old PFM discussion into a broader policy context of 
determining questions such as “Who does what to generate sustainable growth? 
How these activities are financed? What is the balance between taxation and various 
instruments to spread financing costs over a reasonable period, and the measures to 
mitigate risks of default? Where does the money flow? And what are the effects and 
outcomes of the spending? The wider institutional arrangements governing these 
questions and issues become the focus of the policy choices. The asymmetric flow of 
information poses problems, and affects the incentives for central or local officials to 
play games with other levels or donors, or to misappropriate resources. The design 
and incentive structures have immediate implications for the sustainability of the 
growth process. 
 
The context matters, and nominally similar organizational structures (see North 
1990) may generate very different results or outcomes in different countries. We 
focus in this paper on the need for tighter standards on the flow and availability of 
information on the sources and uses of funds. Some of the associated institutional 
requirements are also discussed. However, it is increasingly recognized that the 
design and financing of public policy are very closely interrelated and it is a mistake 
to treat the issues completely separately (Ahmad and Best, 2012).  
 
In Section I we set the stage for sustainable growth, examining the global need for 
investment, given limited public resources. The availability of resources in certain 
parts of the world, e.g., the sovereign wealth funds, seeking assured returns, 
suggests the need for intermediation—including by long-term instruments, as 
emphasized by the G30 report, together with risk mitigation, e.g., by multilateral 
agencies. However, to the extent that national governments are involved, e.g., 
through public private partnerships, this also puts a premium on the recognition of 
public liabilities in the medium-to-long term, and need for effective tax policies. 
Throughout, the nexus between policy and institutional arrangements remains 
critical. 
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In Section II we examine issues related to accountability at different levels of 
government—these are inexorably linked to the policy decisions of who does what. 
Again, both policies and institutional arrangements are intertwined.  
 
Section III relates to the second ingredient of incentives and accountability—linked 
to whether or not sub-national entities have access to own-source revenues. This 
makes it easier to link responsibilities to outcomes, and the presence of own-source 
revenues facilitates the implementation of hard budget constraints. 
 
Incentive issues are also associated with the efficient design of tax policies and 
associated administrations. The development of wide-base and interlinked taxes, 
particularly the income taxes and the VAT provides a potential to finance critical 
spending on the social sectors that is critical for growth, as well as operations and 
maintenance for investment. This also highlights the need for cross-jurisdictional 
tax administrations—particularly at the central or federal levels. Split tax bases 
could be addressed by complicated and overlapping tax administrations. There may 
also be a possibility for the establishment of independent revenue agencies, which 
could service the central and intermediate tiers of government—on an agency 
model (like central banks).  The political acceptability of this option may need to be 
explored, and considerable work is needed in this regard, especially in Latin 
America, but also in Asia.  
 
For more typical local tax assignments, the administrative issues are less 
problematic. These could be seen as a continuum linked to capacities. Different 
administrative functions could be tailored for specific contexts with possibilities of 
asymmetric arrangements, especially for large metropolitan areas. 
 
In Section IV we focus on selected issues relating to the management of the 
spending process at each level of government. The key issue governing 
accountability is the timely, standardized and consistent flow of information on who 
spends what and the results of the process. We focus on minimizing the incentives 
to “play games” in multi-level countries and common markets/currency unions. 
There are benefits from the use of the full GFS2001 framework, as well as an 
efficient following of the cash. We also address the special case of “kicking the can 
down the road,” now being seen with public-private-partnerships, including in the 
most advanced countries, and measures to minimize the build-up of public 
liabilities. 
 
Section V examines transfer design. Earmarked and gap-filling transfers can 
completely offset the positive incentive effects of own-source revenues and efficient 
expenditure management institutions. We make the case for equalization transfer 
systems—almost completely absent from Latin America, and apart from China, not 
extensively used in Asia. We also put in context the case of performance-based 
transfers, which are increasingly popular with donors and international agencies. As 
with other popular measures, the preconditions for making these measures work 
effectively are poorly understood. 
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I. Sustainable Growth—an enabling policy framework 
 
Sustainable growth in developing countries requires significant resources to meet 
infrastructure gaps, and equally for building human capital, providing productive 
employment opportunities, and mitigating risks facing households. These are not 
competing objectives, but rather reflect complementarities for achieving high 
quality and sustainable growth.   
 
It is unlikely that tax revenues in the short to medium term will be sufficient to 
cover the magnitude of investment needed, and there is a good case to be made for 
public borrowing for investment—to facilitate private sector investment.  Given 
excess savings in some parts of the world, and considerable investment needs 
elsewhere with relatively high social and economic rates of return, risk mitigating 
intermediation is likely to be increasingly important. Additionally, sound 
macroeconomic policies are essential in providing an enabling environment, 
conducive to sustainable growth. 
 
While the recent G30 report correctly placed emphasis on the private sector, longer 
maturity investments are unlikely to take place without significant risk mitigation. 
This may involve both national governments and an increasing role for cross-border 
risk mitigation by existing multilateral agencies (such as CAF in Latin America) or a 
new BRIC Bank representing regions with excess investible resources in search of 
assured returns.  While the G30 report downplays the role of the public sector, given 
the need for fiscal consolidation in many parts of the world, the suggested solution 
for reliance on public private partnerships does not provide a mechanism to avoid 
domestic resource mobilization. Indeed, the disincentives involved in PPPs without 
clear delineation of responsibilities have been the cause for many of the current 
difficulties faced in different parts of the world, as the can gets kicked down the 
road.  
 
As we discuss below in Section III, steps are being taken globally to recognize the 
public in PPPs, and tighter accounting rules are being proposed to prevent the can 
being kicked down the road. The key issue relates to the time horizon over which 
the liabilities are recognized. This provides a time frame within which domestic 
resource mobilization in specific countries must be cast. China presents a very 
interesting case of the interlinkages between structural change and tax reforms—
the transformation initiated in the late 1970s had to be buttressed by major tax 
reforms in the early 1990s. This provided the basis for the sustained growth over 
the following two decades. And now, tax reforms are forming the basis for the 
subsequent structural change over the coming decade (see Ahmad, Rydge and Stern, 
2013). 
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Tax revenues should be related to a clearly defined role for the state, including 
provision of public services (for general government), as well as public 
responsibilities for investment and infrastructure—within a medium-term 
framework. As described in Ahmad and Stern (1991), the structure of taxes should 
reflect considerations of productive efficiency, distributional considerations, as well 
as administrative feasibility. In principle, combinations of tax instruments could be 
used to meet distributional considerations—e.g., a single rate VAT could be used in 
conjunction with selective excises to generate overall progressivity in the indirect 
tax system—and the concern for the poorest could be met through targeted 
transfers. As described in Ahmad, Best and Pöschl (2012), “holes” in the tax system 
designed to meet distributional concerns, or to encourage specific industries, 
eventually degenerate into shelters for “cheating”, and often fail to generate 
revenues or meet the stated objectives as well. 
 
Tax instruments can also affect demand and supply responses to reduce carbon 
emissions or consumption of bads, and provide financing for compensatory 
measures if needed. This would be a key element of a desirable overall tax structure, 
reflecting government preferences in multilevel administrations.  
 
The key role of tax policy in supporting investment and structural change lies in the 
creation of a level playing field—as opposed to incentives and “holes”. Further, 
access to own-source revenues at the subnational level is essential to provide 
incentives for responsibility and efficiency. Overall, the level of tax revenues has to 
be commensurate with the buildup of reserves to meet current and future liabilities 
in a sustainable manner.  Indeed, the extent to which the public sector can gear 
additional resources for investment depends on the feasible revenue-envelope in 
the medium-term. National and subnational fiscal rules need to be devised 
accordingly (Ter-Minassian, forthcoming). 
 
In the sections to follow, we examine the issues of which level of government should 
do which function to enhance growth prospects. In each case, the ways in which the 
spending is financed influences the effectiveness of the spending, and incentives for 
accountability. 
II. Spending and accountability 
 
It is critical for public spending to be clearly defined, accountable and linked to 
financing and build up of liabilities. Many large-scale investment projects that 
facilitate the operation of the private sector are in the domain of the central 
government, or even at the supranational level (in the EU with structural policies; or 
the CAF financing cross-border infrastructure in Latin America). 
 
Trends towards decentralization are evident in both OECD and developing 
countries.  But evidence on the supposed links between the decentralization process 
  7 
and the generation of growth remain tenuous at best (Ahmad, Brosio and Tanzi, 
2008). This puts much greater emphasis on the incentive compatible design of 
decentralization process in order to achieve the growth potential that undoubtedly 
exists. 
 
Countries decentralize for many reasons, and often the political dimensions 
dominate the purely technocratic, normative assignments. This often has to do more 
with satisfying disparate groups and keeping the country together than arguments 
related to efficiency in the provision of public services as well as to engender 
sustainable growth.3  However, whatever the motivation governing the degree and 
sequencing of decentralization, public policy has to be concerned with overall 
welfare, especially that of the marginalized and poorer sections of society, the 
effectiveness with which public services are delivered, and the scope for sustainable 
growth. This paper takes a “political economy” perspective in relation to the 
institutions needed for the effective provision of public services at the subnational 
level., and particularly the responsibility for investment needs, where the benefits 
and costs may be spread across jurisdictions as well as over time (hence spanning 
the tenure of most sub-national governments) 
 
A useful typology of spending responsibilities and how different countries approach 
the issues is given in Chart 1 that addresses the subsidiarity principle. This states 
that assignments should be devolved to the lowest level capable of effectively 
providing them.  This is a general principle of the EU legal framework, constraining 
the supranational level from legislation to areas where action at the national, 
regional or local levels is insufficient. 4 The concept has both legal and political 
ramifications. The focus is on scale as well as effects, including externalities, on 
other jurisdictions, and this has given rise to actionable cases where there is a legal 
connotation, as in the EU.5 In political terms, the concept of subsidiarity is often 
taken beyond the multi-level government connotation to also include the 
boundaries between the private sector and the role of the state (at any level).The 
presumption, especially be conservative commentators in the US, is that as far as 
possible the private sector should be encouraged to provide public services, as this 
is expected to be more efficient than public provision. 
 
Chart 1 shows the differing trends regarding the centralization/ decentralization 
debate in different countries or regions. The arguments for decentralization of 
functions are based largely on accountability and effective provision, given the 
subsidiarity principles. But it is not enough to legislate the assignments—the lower 
                                                        
3 Despite the expectation, the linkages between decentralization and growth are 
somewhat tenuous, and are surveyed in Ahmad and Brosio (2009). 
4 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/12002E_EN.pdf. 
5 An interesting example is the European Court of Justice’s rejection of a case 
brought by the German Government against an EU Directive on Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes (Case C-233/94).  
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levels have to have the capabilities as well as the incentives to provide the services. 
Both these are linked closely to the financing issue, as well as incentives for effective 
provision.  Thus, arguments that local governments lack “capacity” are not strictly 
binding if they have the financial resources to hire skilled workers. 
 
 
 
Chart 1 
 
 
 
An important hypothesis governing accountability comes through the electoral 
process when voters are able to assess the performance of their “elected” rulers in 
relation to the standards obtaining in neighboring jurisdictions. 6  Again, the 
incentives are critical, and voters are more likely to be responsive, if at the margin, 
local governments rely on own-source revenues--over which they control rates or 
bases—(see Ambrosiano and Bordignon 2006 for a discussion of the general issues, 
and Gadenne 2012 for an interesting assessment based on the case of Rio da 
Janiero). 
                                                        
6 See Salmon  (1987, 2006), Besley and Case (1995). A recent extension by Salmon 
posits that cross-country comparisons may be even more important for voters.  
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Offsetting the decentralization trends are concern that limit subsidiarity—mainly 
externalities such as spillovers (including with environmental considerations), 
congestion and economies of scale. Moreover, decentralization especially of 
resource bases could exacerbate inequalities across regions and also limit the extent 
of interpersonal redistribution that might be feasible. In all cases, there is a role for 
the Federal, Central or Supranational agencies to coordinate and harmonize 
essential policies. In the United States and some other federations, the maintenance 
of a unified economic space has been facilitated through a “commerce clause.”  In 
the EU, a common economic space is ensured through the common external tariff 
and harmonization of the country-level VATs (see the EU Sixth Directive) to 
minimize harmful competition.  Thus, a combination of legal and regulatory 
frameworks is essential to ensure equality of treatment and opportunity.  Again, for 
this to work efficiently, full information is needed on who spends what, and the 
buildup of assets and liabilities, and as the recent EU experience illustrates, 
inadequate attention to the standardized flow of information could jeopardize a 
common economic space. 
 
Developing countries have tended to take either a gradual approach to 
decentralization—focusing on capacities and relying heavily on overlapping 
functional responsibilities (especially in Latin America—such as in Bolivia and 
Peru).7 While this may prevent “wasteful spending”, it does not guarantee that the 
local governments will take responsibility for functions or sub-functions, such as 
primary education. This is because they are not responsible for the full function, and 
for important economic components (such as wages or full operations and 
maintenance—see Section 2 below). Especially in the face of weak information 
systems (Brazil is an exception in Latin America—and Mexico is the other end of the 
spectrum),8 the prospect of holding local governments responsible for any public 
function is tenuous at best—limiting the role that yardstick competition may play to 
improve spending outcomes. 
 
At the other extreme, some countries (especially in Asia—Indonesia a decade ago, 
and Pakistan in 2010) have adopted a “big-bang” approach, with a rapid devolution 
of functions. In the Indonesian case, this was from the center to the third tier—or 
districts--largely to prevent adding to centrifugal pressures that had been present in 
a large and diverse country. While the devolution was accompanied by a new 
revenue-sharing, the incentive structures were distorted by the design of transfers 
that encouraged the creation of new jurisdictions more than the effective provision 
of public services. Discontent with the level of public service provision has led to the 
gradual devolution of own-source revenues (through the property tax), as well as a 
new set of service delivery norms. 
 
                                                        
7 See Ahmad and García-Escribano (2011). 
8 Mexican Ministry of Finance and Public Credit and IMF, FAD 2007--Ahmad et al. 
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While simple norms can work to galvanize local opinion by providing standards to 
judge local government performance, these have to be accompanied by transfer 
design that do not distort incentives, as well as much freer flow of information on 
service delivery spending and outcomes in relevant neighboring jurisdictions. In the 
Indonesian case, there is considerable work to be done to coordinate and 
standardize information generated at the local level, and by the Ministries of Home 
Affairs and Finance (none of these sources agree on the details of local spending). 
Moreover, very detailed norms (that resemble GOSPLAN) may actually be 
unimplementable given the very limited information flows that are available at the 
present time. 
 
In Pakistan, the Musharraf devolution at around the same time as Indonesia was 
also to the districts, but unlike Indonesia, neither functions nor financing was made 
clear. This was more a way of avoiding the provinces, which were also centers of 
civilian political power.  This devolution was reversed with the return to democratic 
rule in 2008, and a new constitutional amendment (18th Amendment) devolved full 
functions to provinces in 2010. However, inadequate attention was paid to either 
financing or implementation capacities—and many of the functions appear to have 
become unfunded mandates with a continuing deterioration in the standards of 
public service delivery and outcomes. At the macroeconomic level, the failure of 
national tax reforms has led the federal government to borrow from the banking 
system, effectively crowding out of investment and the private sector. This has led 
to a build up of general government liabilities—with no financing for any level of 
government and a fall in the growth potential to a very low level that leads to a 
stagnation of real income levels. 
 
In the Chinese case—local investment opportunities together with the responsibility 
system led to a growth stimulus. This was sustained by a major tax reform in 1994, 
predicated on creating a State Administration of Taxation, and the implementation 
of central and shared taxes—principally the VAT. This has led to an accumulation of 
reserves for investment. Additional tax reforms are now needed in order to direct 
investment and consumption, and to generate greater local accountability (Ahmad 
and Stern, forthcoming). 
 
As the diverse examples above show, there are no perfect solutions to the issue of 
accountability and ensuring improved service delivery or investment enhancement. 
It is however clear that critical ingredients in getting better outcomes, whether in 
“deconcentrated settings”, or in fully decentralized environments, are to generate 
“standardized information on who spends what and what are the outcomes in terms 
of spending as well as resulting assets and liabilities. 
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III. Sub-national Revenue Assignments, Management and 
Accountability 
 
The links between policy and management and incentive structures is clearly 
illustrated in the case of national and subnational revenues. Own-source revenues at 
the margin are recognized as critical in establishing incentives for subnational 
governments to effectively provide services and manage spending efficiently 
(Ambrosiano and Bordignon. 2006). Own-source revenues are also critical in 
establishing hard-budget constraints, as without own-source revenues the ability to 
repay debt incurred becomes questionable.  
 
As described in Ahmad and Brosio (2009a), Latin American countries generally do 
not have adequate own-source revenues at the regional or intermediate level.  
Brazil’s sub-national VAT is an exception, however, it causes distortions, problems 
with trade facilitation and encourages “cheating.”  In most countries the centralizing 
effect of the VAT is apparent, and revenue-shares do not constitute own-source 
revenues in a strict sense, and operate like transfers as local governments do not 
have control over rate structures or the base of the tax (see Table 1, columns 1a and 
1b). The revenue-shares are, however, critical in meeting the vertical imbalances; 
and alternatives need to be sought that do not involve the complexity of both the 
policy framework as well as difficulties with administration. Indeed, the two are 
clearly linked. 
 
Splitting the revenue base for the major taxes—such as the ISR (Income taxes) and 
VAT in Mexico, with firms under 2m pesos being administered by the states under 
the small taxpayer (REPECOS) regime, creates an additional loophole that further 
adds to the incentives to informality and cheating in Mexico,9 leading to a non-oil 
tax/GDP ratio of around 10%.  States have little incentive or capability of auditing 
REPECOS companies, most of which are bunched at the bottom end—suggesting 
that they pay just enough to satisfy the states and to keep the Federal SAT off their 
backs (Ahmad, Best and Pöschl, 2013).   
 
Consolidating the ISR as well as the VAT, and creating a new business tax at the local 
level may be a possible solution. For the States, in principle, a piggy-back or 
surcharge on the income tax, and a Canadian-style dual VAT, could both provide 
them with own-source revenues without the need to establish a separate tax 
administration (see Columns 2a and 2b in Table 1). One could think of a continuum 
of tax policy/administration functions that could be gradually devolved to 
                                                        
9 It is estimated that evasion from the REPECOS is around 95% (SAT, 2011); and this 
creates additional incentives for firms to hide their transactions.  
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subnational governments, depending on the policy framework and capacity to 
administer (see Table 1).  
 
There is also an important political economy element in the choices, as subnational 
governments may not trust a national or federal revenue administration—which are 
becoming more common in Latin America (see Table 2). The political economy 
difficulties may be reduced if the revenue administrations are converted into 
Independent boards, like Central Banks, but with representation from states and 
subnational governments on the Boards. This, however, also faces formidable 
political economy constraints in specific countries and would have to be very 
carefully discussed with various levels of government in order to achieve a buy-in. 
 
 
Table 1. 
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Table 2
 The situation is better at the municipal level, where the property tax is correctly 
recognized as being important in many countries—although it is not strictly a local 
tax in many others (with the regions/states having an important role in countries 
like Mexico and Bolivia in setting rates and other elements of the administration 
matrix—see Table 1). 
 
From the perspective of local accountability and responsibility, having own-source 
revenues is critical. As we have seen above, the capacity constraints need not be 
binding, and international agencies like CEPAL/IADB could assist with the work 
towards making revenue agencies truly independent, and encouraging piggy-backed 
options at the states/departmental levels; and developing business and property 
taxes at the local level, again using the principles of modern tax administration 
relying on self assessment, accurate flow of information on transactions and 
valuations. The use of third party information, as is being developed in South Asia, 
might be another area where loopholes and incentives for informality might be 
“closed.” 
 
Asymmetric arrangements are needed for large metropolitan areas, such as in the 
case of Mexico City or Bogotá, Beijing or Shanghai, which operate as 
states/provinces, as well as local governments. These are often the main engines of 
growth, and the proper institutional structures and incentives are needed to achieve 
the most efficient outcomes.  
 
Creating own-source revenue handles is a first step. Ensuring that states and local 
governments have the incentives to use them depends on the design of the transfer 
system. If transfers are designed to meet deficits and gaps, there will be no incentive 
to use own-source revenue handles and manage spending efficiently. 
  16 
 
IV. Expenditure Management and Accountability 
 
The main issue from the perspective of implementing appropriate institutions for 
the management of public funds is to ensure that there are incentives to make local 
governments accountable to local electorates. Also, there should be responsibility 
for funds received from the center/supranational agencies and donors; and the use 
of credit should be managed in a transparent and sustainable manner. This involves 
more than a mere transplant of organizational structures from developed countries, 
but also to ensure that these are used effectively. Thus, the process is much broader 
than a ticking off of boxes in a PEFA matrix, much emphasized by the Bretton-
Woods Institutions, but addressing the incentives for and ability to “play games.”  
 
It is clear that poor information flows reduce local accountability, negate yardstick 
competition, and also facilitate game-play vis a vis the central or supranational/ 
international agencies. The game-play has been clearly highlighted in the case of the 
EU and incentives for autonomous agencies as well as regional and local 
governments to “hide” information or “kick the can down the road.” Limited 
information flows also facilitate rent-seeking and diversion of resources.  
 
Relatively few countries in Latin America or Asia utilize, for both the central as well 
as the subnational governments, the full format of the IMF’s Government Financial 
Statistics Manual 2001 (GFSM2001)—which is designed to ensure conformity of the 
financial information with the System of National Accounts.10 Multiple formats in 
Mexico at the Federal level and across the states make it difficult to generate 
standardized information for general government. This makes it problematic to 
ensure comparability across subnational entities or engender accountable 
competition across states.  Brazilian states, while not conforming to the GFSM2001, 
perform better than Mexico in that the Federation requires a standardized format to 
receive, report and report on Federal resources as well as their own resources. 
 
Without a complete a complete and standardized format to categorize the cycle of 
revenues and expenses; in conjunction with a tracking of the cash flows; the 
likelihood of “game-play” by various levels of government or government agencies 
cannot be ruled out.  A typical problem is the inconsistent treatment of budget 
                                                        
10 A number of countries use transition matrices for the reporting of central or 
general government information to the IMF in the GFSM2001 format. Pakistan for 
example reports data only for the budgetary central government in the latest issue 
of the GFS Manual. This is inadequate, as much of the social spending takes place at 
the subnational level. 
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coverage—with the frequent exclusion of spending of government agencies or 
liabilities parked in public enterprises.  
 
In the very simple example of chart 2, the cash transactions of a government are 
shown as set C.  This is a subset of F, which also includes financial assets and 
liabilities. In turn, F can be denoted as a sub-set of R, which also includes all 
currently assets and liabilities. It is relatively simple for governments to reduce 
deficits in cash (C) or financial assets (F), without affecting all recognized liabilities 
(R) or extended net worth based on future flows (E). For instance, (sub-national or 
national) governments could engage in game-play, by 
 
• Selling non-financial assets in R, for cash in F; 
• Assuming future pension liabilities in E, for cash and financial assets in F; 
• Securitization C of future revenue streams F (common in Latin American 
local governments; 
• Treating borrowing F as revenue C (several US States). 
 
 
Chart 2 
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The sets C, F and R are consistent with the IMF GFSM2001. These represent nested 
sets of information, and if presented in parallel with E, virtually removes the scope 
for game-play by governments at any level.   
 
Standardized information is critical for any serious implementation of fiscal rules in 
multi-level countries/currency unions. This should be based on the consistent and 
systematic generation of information in the overlapping manner described above. 
 
There is a growing popularity of performance budgeting at the center (in both Latin 
American and Asian countries, including Mexico and Pakistan), as well as 
participatory budgeting at the local levels. Often bilateral donors, seeking to 
improve budgetary outcomes, drive this tendency. It is clear that focusing on 
outcomes is a useful addition to a regular budget process, but does not eliminate the 
need for a consistent, standardized and timely flow of information, so that 
electorates and policy makers are able to judge the true costs of their policy choices. 
 
The importance of the GFSM2001 cannot be over-stressed, not for reporting to the 
IMF, but for the efficient management of finances in multi-level countries and in 
common markets/currency unions. This has implications for the assistance that 
could be provided by CEPAL, the IADB and the BWIs to member countries—
stressing the importance of a consistent chart-of-accounts for each subnational 
government consistent with GFSM2001.  This will involve changes to the GFMISs at 
the national and subnational level being implemented in countries like Peru, Bolivia 
and Indonesia. This also has implications for Brazil, as it seeks to upgrade its very 
successful SIAFI dating from the 1990s; and for countries in the EU (such as 
Portugal and Spain) as they struggle to get to grips with the discovery of liabilities in 
the extended public sector as well as at the regional and subnational levels. 
 
PPPs—kicking the can down the road? 
 
PPPs have been encouraged, including by international finance agencies, as a means 
of leveraging “private sector” expertise for public investment project, and also 
bypassing bureaucratic bottlenecks. This is believed to generate efficiencies, and 
improved value for money, especially at the subnational level. The expectation is 
that this will generate additional growth through the efficiencies and additional 
private finances that would be utilized. 
 
The problem is that governments, especially although not exclusively at the 
subnational level; see PPPs as a means of circumventing budget constraints. This 
could generate legal obfuscations, and relevant official agencies or governments are 
either not fully aware of the liabilities, or the ability of the private partner to meet 
them. Sometimes, the issue of liability for full costs is avoided, often with respect to 
public infrastructure (highways and hospitals in Europe); and local governments 
only include the annual contractual cash payment on the budget, and generally only 
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during the tenure of the concerned local government.  Often, there is no 
provisioning for the eventual reversion of the assets to the public sector. Further, 
there is usually a continuation of public interventions with respect to prices or 
distribution.  
 
There is also incomplete and asymmetric information, with costs and efforts for 
projects generally known only to the private partner, and significant incentives for 
either the private contractor or the government to renege (Danau and Vinella, 
2012). An example of a growing recognition of limited commitment comes from the 
UK (which was in the forefront of the PPP revolution).  In the 2002-3 upgrading of 
the London Underground, Metronet the contracting consortium could not borrow 
the full amount of funds needed for the project. Consequently, Transport for 
London, the decentralized agency responsible guaranteed 95% of Metronet’s debt 
obligations. Metronet failed, and the UK Government (Department of Transport) had 
to pay Transport for London a sum of £ 1.7 billion to enable it to meet the guarantee 
(House of Lords, 2010). The direct cost to taxpayers was estimated to be as high as 
£410million. Other examples from the UK, e.g., for wind farm projects, show that in 
these cases the private contribution was financed by complex financial instruments 
that are tantamount to debt—that has eventually to be taken over by the state. 
 
As a result of the difficulties above, the International Accounting Standards Board 
(2011) has issued a new set of guidelines (IPSAS 32) 11 that force an upfront 
accounting for PPPs, and would significantly affect deficits and recognition of 
liabilities for general government—i.e., for both central and sub-central 
governments and related agencies. This ensures that the operator is effectively 
compensated for services rendered during the period of the concession period. It 
requires the government or granting public agency to recognize assets and liabilities 
in their financial statements, when the following are met: 
 
• The government or granting public agency controls or regulates the services 
to be provided, the target beneficiaries or the price; and 
• If the grantor controls through ownership, beneficial entitlement or 
otherwise, a significant residual interest in the asset at the end of the 
arrangement. 
 
In the schema of Chart 2, this would involve elements in the areas R and E.  This 
avoids the situation where neither the public or private partner recognizes the 
asset/liability at the end of the period. Of course, as has been seen in Ireland and 
Spain recently (and with Mexican road in the early 1990s), even if there are no 
explicit guarantees by the federal or state governments and there is sufficient 
                                                        
11 See IASB (2011), IPSAS 32. This standard is also likely to affect the guidelines of 
Eurostat that are not so tightly defined. 
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pressure on the banking system, it is likely that the state will assume a significant 
portion of the liabilities.  
 
The implications are that (1) the annual budgets for each level of government must 
be cast in a medium-term framework; (2) it is essential to undertake a full and 
careful evaluation of assets and liabilities and associated accounting and reporting 
of risks with a sufficiently long time horizon (using international standards, such as 
the GFSM2001); and (3) it is always important to be able to track the cash, and the 
design of national and subnational TSAs becomes critical. 
 
Following the cash—TSAs and transparency 
 
One of the most important common features of budget systems across the world, 
whether of the “traditional” line item variety (as in most developing countries—and 
Germany), or of the more modern flexible systems, that rely on spending agency 
accountability (as in Scandinavia), is a treasury single account (TSA). This 
institutional feature has been recommended by the IMF in a large number of 
countries as part of its Technical Assistance and Capacity Development.  Despite 
some successes, as in PR China, establishing a TSA has proved elusive in countries 
from Mexico (the only OECD country without a TSA a the time of writing) to 
Pakistan.  
 
The difficulty in establishing a TSA lies primarily in vested interests, both political as 
well as bureaucratic (for details, see Ahmad and Jensen, forthcoming). Often at the 
national level, there is spending by security agencies, donors, and other political 
centers of power— and the key question is whether these can be included within 
the TSA?   
 
The same issues arise with respect to sub-national entities. Should local 
governments have their own TSAs? Should they use a central TSA?  What are the 
problems posed by donors, both multilateral (such as the World Bank) or bilateral 
agencies that may not trust the local governments to use their funds efficiently or 
without significant leakages? 
 
Some countries do not have sufficiently large subnational entities for it to be 
efficient to establish local TSAs.12 In some cases, the IMF has recommended that the 
local governments use the central TSA. While this may be desirable in principle, the 
practice can be a severe problem. Suddenly, local governments face a closure of 
their bank accounts, and do not know where the money goes and their balances. 
                                                        
12 The Chinese provinces are larger than most countries and have their own TSAs, 
nested and linked with the Central TSA in Beijing. This is a very interesting model 
and could usefully be examined in the larger multi-level countries—e.g., other 
members of the BRICS and countries of similar size, such as Indonesia or Pakistan. 
  21 
And in order to issue payment orders, they have to send emissaries to the central 
Ministry of Finance and petition the Treasury to release funds. This adds to the 
complexity of the local budget process and could endanger the decentralization 
process. 
 
What are the problems with donors—seen e.g., in a range of countries? The 
insistence to keep separate bank accounts for their spending poses the risk of 
parallel budget processes, and makes it hard for either local or central governments 
to get a grip on total spending. Besides obfuscating the budget process, it reduces 
the accountability for achieving results. 
 
A solution is shown in Chart 3—with a modification of the TSA principle often used 
for “independent” bodies, including security agencies—the principle of establishing 
correspondent accounts (CA) within a TSA.  Thus CA1 would be the account of local 
government 1; and CA2 that for a bilateral agency, say the GIZ that might want to 
keep its operations separate, or even a security agency at the national level. 
 
If there is a GFMIS, then the operations of the CA become the responsibility of the 
local government or the bilateral/security agency. They could issue payment orders 
to the extent of their resources in each account. Without a GFMIS, it may be 
necessary to establish a series of zero-balance accounts in commercial banks, again 
subject to the resources in the respective accounts. This cuts through the 
bureaucracy, and yet all levels of government have full information on who spends 
what and when. Thus, both cash management (best managed at the central level in 
most cases), and information flows are facilitated. 
 
This small example illustrates that often the first best may makes matters worse, if 
implemented without thinking in inappropriate conditions. It is often necessary to 
work through why there is no TSA in a particular context, and then try and address 
the issues on a case-by-case basis. This involves work to understand the political 
economy constraints in each case. 
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Chart 3 
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V. Incentive Structures and Design and Management of Transfer 
Systems 
 
All the carefully designed and implemented incentive structures described above 
could be negated if a transfer system were to cover all deficits and debts without 
any constraints. The creation of a level playing field through a system of 
equalization transfers is critical—this should enable all subnational governments to 
provide similar levels of services at similar levels of tax effort.   
 
However, for investment needs and infrastructure gaps to maximize the growth 
potential, it would be useful to begin to create the preconditions for performance-
based transfers. This would ensure that the investments produce results and are 
managed efficiently. Such transfers could also be used to promote central 
government objectives, such as social protection for the marginalized and most 
vulnerable. However, care needs to be taken should the transfers be implemented in 
areas of local government jurisdiction, as this could lead to a diversion of resources 
and additional “game play.” 
 
1. Earmarked transfers 
 
Many countries try to achieve central government objectives in an increasingly 
decentralized context through a system of earmarked transfers. The biggest 
drawback of excessive earmarking is that it overrides local preferences, and is 
inimical to the basic philosophy underlying the decentralized processes—i.e., to 
generate accountability for local responsibilities. Moreover, a big constraint faced by 
countries with weak PFM systems, and poor information on who spends what, is 
that it is hard to ensure that the funds are not diverted to other heads that may be 
more important for local officials—or just stolen. 
  
As described in Ahmad (2009), it may be possible to offset some of the PFM 
disadvantages by inducing competition among recipient jurisdictions, using simple 
performance criteria. The basic idea is that a medium-term budget framework is put 
in place, and the transfers in period t+2 are made conditional on achieving targets 
set for period t+1.   
 
Thus, if growth and employment generation is an objective, and is not achieved by 
additional transfers given to the metropolitan areas, it may be useful to reconsider 
the strategy in the coming period. Also the relationships between the metropolitan 
administration and the decentralized subordinate municipalities would clearly need 
to be clarified. Eventually, when the PFM systems are strong enough, and the court 
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systems function efficiently, one could consider “contract” based transfers (Spahn, 
2006). 
 
 
 
2. Equalization transfers 
Design 
 
Under a modern system of “equalization” the objective could be to “assign transfers 
so that subnational governments could provide equal standards of service at equal 
levels of tax effort”. This is the modern mechanism that has been used across States 
in Australia, provinces in China, and municipalities and districts in Denmark, 
Hungary. A more restricted arrangement based on equalizing revenue capacities 
only is used in Canada—but a replication of this to other countries assume that local 
governments have some control over local revenue bases (either through control 
over rates or through elements involved in the tax administration. 
 
Very simply, the equalization framework would be based on “standardized” factors. 
This ensures that local governments would not be able to influence the magnitude of 
the transfer by their actions or lack of actions (see Ahmad and Searle, 2006, for a 
description of alternative models). 
 
The standardized transfers thus become more or less “lump sum” and do not distort 
incentives at the local level. The standardized spending responsibilities would 
address differential costs of provision for services assigned to them, with higher 
costs in remotely populated areas, as well as densely populated urban districts. 
Similarly, the own-revenue potential would be based on standardized revenue 
(spatial distribution of bases, assuming average rates), and the fact that a local 
government chooses not to exploit a revenue base would not lead to a higher grant. 
Thus, there would be an incentive to better utilize assigned revenue bases.  
 
The equalization framework in Indonesia started out in 2001 on the basis of 
standardized factors, but these were changed into actual spending and transfers—
converting it into an estimate of the actual gap. This completely changed the 
incentive structure, as the deficit came under the control of local governments and 
generated a trend towards inefficient expansion of spending, especially on 
personnel and benefits.  
 
It is important to avoid complexity in the design of equalization frameworks. The 
Australian model has been criticized as having become so complicated that it 
becomes hard to judge the economic outcomes and implications (see Shah, this 
volume). However, there has been a conscious attempt in the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission to simplify models and factors used to estimate disabilities. The 
Chinese application of the Australian equalization framework also used very simple 
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factors, such as relevant population for the functions being equalized. Clearly, 
population, which is also used as the basis for simple transfers (which makes it a 
very political variable), is still important as a factor for equalization. But using it in a 
standardized manner to evaluate relative costs or needs diffuses the perceived 
concerns with the population variable—as the simplified mechanism of total 
population could be “disequalizing” in the sense that more transfers might be 
provided to the better-off regions.   
 
Overall, a modern equalization framework should shift the focus from 
“entitlements” to a political focus on service delivery by local governments. This 
helps with local oversight and could help also generate “yardstick competition”. In 
the following, some common formulations for general-purpose transfers are 
discussed. 
Formula-based General Purpose Transfers
13
 
 
There are five types of formulas currently used around the world for general 
transfers.  
a. Transfers based on equal per capita allocations 
 
This is the simplest system for allocation of grants requiring only information on 
population. It is used in a number of countries, such as Germany for the allocation of 
a share of VAT and Canada for the allocation of the block grant for health and social 
services. It assumes that population is a suitable indicator of local expenditure 
needs. It also has minimal equity content since it gives the same per capita amount 
to poor and rich areas, although it does not consider revenues.  The formula would 
be as follows: 
 
TRi = (Pi/P) x TR 
 
where TR is the transfer; P is population; i stands for local unit i. Variables without i 
refer to the country total.  
 
Countries at an early stage in their intergovernmental arrangements, such as 
Cameroon, have used this formulation. While the population figures are relatively 
robust in principle, once the transfers are linked to this factor, there is hesitancy in 
updating the figures—so that there is not much of a shift in resource allocation 
patterns. The figure has thus become “politicized.” Moreover, by definition, more 
resources flow to where the population density is greatest—and these tend to be 
the richest areas with the best facilities. This potentially introduces a bias against 
the less well to do areas, or where there are higher costs of provision of services 
(typically the poorer areas). 
                                                        
13 This section is based on Ahmad and Brosio (2010). 
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b. Formulae based on general indicators of expenditure needs 
 
These formulae are very popular and derive from the previous one by adding other 
indicators of needs such as poverty incidence, area, population density, infant 
mortality, and (inverse) of GDP. The indicators are not related to distinct 
expenditure responsibilities assigned to local governments, but to their total 
expenditure. 
 
An illustration of a simple formula follows, with three equally weighted indicators:  
geographic area and the number of poor persons, in addition to population: 
 
TRi = Pi/P x 1/3 TR + Povi/Pov x 1/3 TR + Ai/A x 1/3 TR, 
 
where in addition to previous symbols Pov is the number of poor persons and A is 
area (km2). 
 
The difficulty with this formulation is that it is hard to link the factors with reasons 
for spending or transfers. Indeed, perverse incentives can be created, such as the 
need to maximize the number of poor in order to attract the highest amount of 
transfers. This could encourage perverse decision-making. 
c. Formulae based on specific indicators of expenditure needs 
 
These formulae are more complex since they use distinct indicators of need for each 
local expenditure responsibility. These are a considerable improvement over the 
general needs formulations, but require more information that may be subject to 
obfuscation if not managed in a transparent way.  
 
An example is provided by South Africa, where the general purpose transfer to the 
provinces is allocated according to a system that has six components: (i) an 
education component, representing 51 percent of the total transfer allocated 
according to population in school age and to school enrolment; (ii) a health 
component, representing 26 percent of the total transfer allocated according to 
population with and without medical aid; (iii) a basic component, representing 14 
percent of the total transfer allocated according to population; (iv) a poverty 
component, representing 3 percent of the total transfer allocated according to the 
number of poor persons (quintiles 1 and 2); (v) an economic activity component, 
representing 1 percent of the total transfer allocated according to GDP; and (vi) an 
institutional component, representing the remaining 5 percent equally distributed 
as a lump sum among provinces. 
 
The formula for the education component would be the following: 
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ETRi = SAPi/SAP x 0.5 ETR + Eni/En x 0.5 ETR 
 
where, in addition to previous symbols, ETR is the education component of the 
transfer; SAP is school-age population; and En is the number of pupils enrolled in 
schools. Similar formulae would apply to other expenditure functions. 
 
One has to be careful with the use of spending information for various functions. If 
actual numbers are used, these are generally under the control of the subnational 
governments. Thus, higher spending would attract higher transfers, and the 
disincentive effects are obvious—as in the Indonesian case.  A general principle is to 
avoid using factors under the direct control of subnational governments. This would 
minimize the incentives for “game-play” that are inherent in this class of formulae 
and transfer design. 
 
d. Formulae based only on fiscal capacity 
 
In this case, the transfer does not take account of expenditure needs, but only 
differences in fiscal capacity. An example is provided by the Canadian system of 
general-purpose transfers to provinces based on differences in tax capacity. This 
formulation assumes, correspondingly, that each province has the same per capita 
expenditure needs. It has to be noted that the Canadian provinces are very large in 
terms of area, which reduces the variance in average expenditure needs. 
Furthermore, the general-purpose transfers to provinces are supplemented with 
specific transfers based on needs—such as for health care or education.  
 
A transfer-design formula based on revenue capacity would be as follows: 
 
TRi= t x (B/P – Bi/Pi) x Pi 
 
where, in addition to the previous symbols, B is the effective tax base (not the 
assessed tax base, but the base that potentially can be assessed; and t is the average 
effective tax rate on the concerned tax base).  
 
Since B/P – Bi/Pi  measures the difference between the per capita national average 
tax base and that of region i, the formula brings the fiscal capacity of those sub-
national governments that are below the national average up to the national 
average, i.e., it provides 100 percent equalization with reference to the national 
average. Equalization can obviously be less intense.  
 
Note that the use of the potential rather than actual addresses the problem of 
incentives. If actual revenues are used for the calculation of transfers, it would 
induce subnational governments to reduce their tax effort. 
d. Formulae that consider both expenditure needs and fiscal capacity 
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These formulas provide the most general approach to equalization systems, and rely 
not only on needs but also the ability to provide for these through own-source 
revenues. Thus, this formulation is closest in spirit to a full accountability for 
assigned functions with the closest linkage between functions and financing. 
Standardized expenditure needs are estimated for each assigned function and linked 
to standardized revenue capacity. The resulting equalization transfer is thus close to 
being “lump-sum” as possible in that local decisions on the level of spending are 
determined by local preferences, as shown in the following formula: 
 
TRi =Nij – FCk 
 
where, in addition to previous symbols, Nij is the standardized expenditure need for 
function j in jurisdiction i. FC is standardized fiscal capacity. As the transfer is “lump-
sum”, the jurisdiction could choose to spend more or less by adjusting own-
revenues than would be implied by the transfer, without affecting the magnitude of 
the transfer. 
 
Such formulae are used in an increasing number of countries such as Australia, 
China, Denmark, Japan, Korea, and the United Kingdom. They can be complex and, as 
in the Australian case, require a considerable amount of information. The recent 
reforms in Australia to simplify the estimation of cost functions and factors, is a step 
towards making the system much more intuitively apparent, moving towards the 
simpler systems adopted in countries with data constraints, as in China. Thus, if 
properly formulated and implemented, full equalization systems can be both 
efficient and equitable. 
3. Management of Transfers: a new Grants Commission 
 
The options to implement an equalization grants system vary from the 
establishment of an independent Grants’ Commission to entrusting the function to 
the Ministry of Finance or other line agency, such as the Ministry of Home Affairs or 
Local Governments, or both Ministries (as in Indonesia). Table 3 presents some 
international experiences. 
 
An independent Grants’ Commission could be established to determine the 
relativities for making equalization transfers, in coordination with the local 
governments. It does not make payments directly, which are routed through the 
Treasury, but establishes the basis and monitors and collects the information 
needed to make the system work. In countries such as Australia, the Grants 
Commission is an independent agency with representation by the subnational 
governments.  
 
In countries such as Mexico or China, the Ministry of Finance manages the Grants 
function. Often there is a separate section within the Treasury/MOF to administer 
this function. 
 
Table 3 Institutional arrangements for Equalization Transfers 
Where a Separate Agency Operates  Is there a 
Separate 
Agency to 
Advise on 
Grants 
Distribution? 
Ministry 
administer-
ing Untied 
Grant 
Distribution  
Is Local 
Government 
Involved in 
Grant 
Decisions? 
Is the 
agency 
permanent
? 
Does it 
operate 
under the 
Constitution 
or a law? 
What is its 
range of 
functions? 
What is the size of 
the agency? 
Australia Yes  Yes Yes Law Narrow Small 
Canada  MoF Yes     
China  MoF ?     
Denmark  MoF Yes     
Ghana Yes  No Yes Constitution Narrow Very small 
Ethiopia  House of 
Federation 
and MoF 
Yes     
India Yes  Yes No Constitution Narrow Small 
Japan  MoLG Yes     
South 
Africa 
Yes MoF and 
MoLG 
Yes Yes Constitution Wide Large 
South 
Korea 
 MoLG Yes     
Sudan Yes MoF Yes Yes Constitution Wide Large 
Uganda Yes  Yes Yes Constitution Wide Small 
 
Note: MoLG = Ministry of Local Government; MoF = Ministry of Finance.   
Source: Searle 2010 in Ahmad and Al Faris, Fiscal Reforms in the GCC, Edward Elgar.
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4. Performance based transfers 
 
There is an expectation that results-based intergovernmental transfers could lead to 
positive infrastructure and service-delivery outcomes, with improved allocative 
efficiency, better implementation, and lower costs. 14  Such grants have been 
increasingly stressed by the international agencies, including the ADB and the 
World Bank.  
 
Performance-based transfers have to be carefully designed and managed, especially if implemented 
in the sphere of subnational government competence. If inadequate attention is paid to the factors 
that could be attributed to local government actions, such transfers could lead to a diversion of own-
resources to less productive activities, and also reduce accountability. The cycle from objectives to 
outcomes has to be carefully specified, and exogenous factors need to be taken into account (see 
Chart 4). 
 
The technical efficiency process is the regular budget process that links the allocation of funds 
through to the funds actually spent, as well as outcomes. These would be normally tracked through 
with the help of a GFMIS, preferably on a standardized basis for all subnational and central/federal 
governments.  The IADB has assisted a number of Latin American countries, including Bolivia, with 
such subnational GFMISs, although with insufficient attention to the Chart of Accounts and tracking 
spending on a GFSM2001 compatible basis. In addition a linkage has to be made between the 
outcomes and the service objectives, and there is a degree of subjectivity in determining the 
exogenous factors that might have played a part. 
 
If the performance-based transfers are based on complex input criteria, or detailed standards that 
cannot be monitored or enforced, the conditionality becomes irrelevant. Similarly, a focus on outputs 
rather than outcomes may lead to unintended or perverse incentives. Nonetheless, even in situations 
where information on budget spending is partial or subject to delays, physical outcomes may be 
relatively simple to identify quickly and accurately—this could be particularly useful for 
infrastructure projects. These could be measured and additional funding in future rounds could be 
made conditional on these outcome indicators (Ahmad and Martinéz, 2010). Care has to be taken to 
ensure that the positive incentives from a performance–based system are not negated by other badly 
designed transfers, for instance based on gap-filling or other distortive criteria.  
 
 
 
Chart 4 
                                                        
14 UNCDF, 2010. “Performance-based Grant Systems: Concept and International 
Experience.”  
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A performance-based system should supplement local government actions and 
responsibility, such as through meeting infrastructure gaps that are hard for local 
governments to address, and which can be easily monitored. In the longer run, more 
effective and standardized PFM systems are essential for information flows to 
improve efficiency and accountability. Similarly, incentive structures depend on 
whether or not sub-national entities have access to own-source revenues and are 
subject to hard budget constraints. While, this mutual interdependency will take 
many years to work through, countries such as Indonesia could introduce simple 
performance-based grants in specific sectors, or discrete areas that will improve 
outcomes. 
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